Abstract Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) technology has been increasingly integrated into numerous applications for authentication of objects or individuals. However, because of its limited computation power, RFID technology may cause several security and privacy issues such as tracking the owner of the tag, cloning of the tags and etc. Recently, two chaotic map-based authentication protocols have been proposed for low-cost RFID tags in order to eliminate these issues. In this paper, we give the security analysis of these protocols and uncover their weaknesses. We prove that these protocols are vulnerable to tag tracing, tag impersonation and de-synchronization attacks. The attack complexity of an adversary is polynomial and the success probability of these attacks are substantial. Moreover, we also propose an improved RFID authentication protocol that employs Chebyshev chaotic maps and complies with the EPCglobal Class 1 Generation 2 standard. Finally, we show that our protocol is resistant against those security issues.
Our contribution: In this paper, we first define a simple generic attack that can be applied to any RFID authentication protocol. We applied this attack to Benssalah et al. ' s authentication protocol and we observed that their protocol does not provide resistance against tag tracking. Next, we analyzed Akgun et al. ' s protocol and proved that their protocol does not satisfy security claims against our attack. Finally, we propose a new enhanced RFID authentication protocol and show that this protocol eliminate those security threats.
Roadmap:
The outline of the paper is given as follows. In Section 2, we give the preliminaries about Chebyshev polynomials and the security and privacy definitions. Section 3 describes Benssalah et al. ' s protocol and then describes Akgun et al.'s authentication protocol. Section 4 introduces our proposed privacy preserving authentication protocol. In Section 5, we first give the attacks on Benssalah et al.'s protocol and Akgun et al. ' s protocol. Then, we give the security proof of our protocol. Section 6 gives the performance comparison of our protocol with the existing protocols. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
Preliminaries
In this section, we first review the definitions of Chebyshev polynomial and the hard problems that employ the enhanced Chebyshev polynomials. Then, we provide the security and privacy definitions which will be used throughout the paper.
Chebyshev Polynomials
In this section, we borrow the definitions from [11] , [36] and [37] . The formal definition of Chebyshev chaotic maps that are proposed by Wang and Zho [32] are given as follows.
Definition 1 (Chebyshev polynomials)
Let x ∈ [−1, 1], and n ∈ N. Then, the subsequent function describes a Chebyshev polynomial map T n : R → R of degree n:
T n (x) = cos(nxarccosx), {x| − 1 ≤ x ≤ 1}, and the recurrent formulas are T n(x) = 2xT n−1 (x) − T n−2 (x) where the integer n ≥ 2, T 0 (x) = 1, and T 1 (x) = x.
Using Definition 1, we have the following first few polynomials: T 2 (x) = 2x 2 − 1, T 3 (x) = 4x 3 − 3x, and T 4 (x) = 8x 4 − 8x 2 + 1. Moreover, Chebyshev polynomials have the following semi-group and commutativity property.
Definition 2 (Semi-group property) Chebyshev polynomials have the following semi-group property:
T r (T s (x)) = T r.s (x) Definition 3 (Commutativity property) Chebyshev polynomials have the following commutativity property:
T r (T s (x)) = T s (T r (x)) Based on Definition 1, the improved Chebyshev polynomials can defined as follows. Note that this definition has been employed in the protocol designs.
Definition 4 (Improved Chebyshev Polynomials) Let x ∈ [−∞, +∞],
N be a big large number and n ≥ 2. Then, the following function defines an improved version of Chebyshev polynomial:
T n (x) = (2xT n−1 (x) − T n−2 (x)) mod N
Obviously, T r (T s (x)) = T s (T r (x)) = T rs (x)
Hence the semigroup property still holds and the improved Chebyshev polynomials also commute under composition.
Definition 5 (Discrete Logarithm Problem) DLP is described as follows:
Given values of x and y, find an α such that T α (x) = y. Definition 6 (Diffie-Hellman Problem) DHP is described as follows. Given a values of x, T s (x) and T r (x), what is values of T rs (x) ? 2.2 The Security Definitions RFID authentication systems are always under the threat of man-in-the-middle attacks due to easy eavesdropping the air transmission between tags and reader. During transmission, an adversary is able to listen, modify or block the messages being transmitted. He/she can also retransmit the messages maliciously to interrogate the tag or the back-end server in order to impersonate the reader or the victim tag. Several security and privacy issues and adversarial models are addressed in [22, 19, 5, 31, 15] in details. In this paper, we consider the following security and privacy notions in the security analysis of authentication protocols.
Paise et al. defines a secure authentication protocol as follows [28] .
Definition 7 (Security) An authentication protocol achieves security provided that it performs both secure tag authentication and secure reader authentication. Let A be a polynomial-time bounded adversary, T i be an uncorrupted alive legal tag and R be the legitimate reader. Then,
-if R identifies A as T i on the session π with non-negligible probability and there is not any matching conversation between T i and π, then tag authentication is not secure. -if T i identifies A on the session π with non-negligible probability and there is not any matching conversation between R and π, then reader authentication is not secure.
Avoine defines the privacy notion of universal untraceability as follows [5] .
Definition 8 (Universal untraceability)
In universal untraceability, an adversary cannot correlate two responses of a tag, where the responses are disconnected with the help of at least a single successful authentication. The following universal untraceability experiment is played between a challenger C and an adversary A.
-Learning Phase: Let A communicates with two legal tags T 0 and T 1 . A is capable of initiating, monitoring, injecting any message, and stopping the sessions between T 0 and R. A can also start, monitor or stop the sessions between T 1 and R. -Challenge Phase: Let a challenger C allow the reader to run successful protocol transcripts with T 0 and T 1 . Then, C randomly selects one of them as a target tag, T b . A communicates with T b . Besides, A can also initiate, monitor or stop the authentication sessions between T b and R. -Guessing Phase: Finally, A finishes the experimental game and produces an output bit b ′ .
Avoine also introduces the privacy notion of existential untraceability as follows [5] .
Definition 9 (Existential untraceability)
In existential untraceability, an adversary cannot correlate two responses of a given tag, where these responses are not necessarily isolated by a successful authentication. The following existential untraceability experiment is played between a challenger C and an adversary A.
-Learning Phase: Let A communicates with two legitimate tags T 0 and T 1 . A is capable of initiating, monitoring, injecting any message or stopping the sessions between T 0 and R. A can also start, monitor or stop the sessions between T 1 and R. Furthermore, a strong adversary can corrupt T i at time t and access to the whole secret values of the tag. Forward untraceability is described as no RFID tag can be traced with the help of past transactions of the tag with the reader even though the adversary tampered the tag [27] . The notion of forward privacy formally described in [7] as follows.
Definition 10 (Forward privacy)
In forward privacy, the following experiment is played between a challenger C and an strong adversary A.
-Learning Phase: Let two legitimate tags T 0 and T 1 communicate with A.
A is capable of initiating, monitoring, injecting any message, and dropping the sessions between T 0 and R. A can also start, monitor, and drop the sessions between T 1 and R. 
Previous Art on Chaotic Map Based Authentication Protocol
In this section, we give the detailed descriptions of two RFID authentication protocols, which utilize the chaotic maps as the underlying hard problem. The first protocol is Benssalah et al.'s authentication protocol. The latter one is Akgun et al.'s authentication protocol which is the improved version of the former one. Both protocols essentially uses cryptographic primitives such as chaotic maps, hash function and xor operation at the reader side but uses only chaotic map and xor in the tag side.
Benssalah et al.'s Authentication Protocol
Benssalah et al. [6] showed some weaknesses of the protocol of Cheng et al. [11] that utilizes the chaotic maps. Then, they suggested an improved version of the protocol and which also employs the enhanced Chebyshev polynomials. Considering the computational requirement, the tags need four chaotic map operations and one pseudo-random number generation. The authors claimed that their authentication scheme is secure against replay, impersonation and denial-of-service attacks. Their protocol also offers mobility and mutual authentication. Table 1 provides the notations used throughout the authentication scheme.
Notation
Attacks to chaotic map-based authentication protocols Table 1 The following notations are used in [6] Notation Definition
ID

ID value of a tag h(.), H(.) Hash functions H(ID)
Hash of an identity (ID) xnew
The newly generated session key
The old session key
T·(·)
The Chebyshev polynomial ⊕ XOR || Concatenation operator ← Substitution operator
Protocol Description
Benssalah et al.'s RFID authentication scheme is depicted in Figure 1 . The scheme consists of two stages: initialization and authentication.
The Initialization Stage: For each tag in the system, the server/owner first picks a random secret key x. Next, the server records the credentials of each tag in its own database, which has the following form: 
The Authentication Stage: Authentication is carried out by performing the following steps.
1. A legitimate RFID reader first picks a random number rǫ R {0, 1} ℓ and broadcasts it. 2. Once received r, the tag picks another random number tǫ R {0, 1} ℓ and computes For each record in the database, the server computes 
Security Analysis of The Protocol
In this protocol, we first give a generic attack that can be applied to any authentication protocol. Then, we show the security issues of this protocol against our attack. Let A be an active adversary who can initiate a protocol with a tag or reader, stop the protocol between a tag and reader, modify the responses from a tag or reader.
Definition 11 (Generic Attack) Let T be the target tag and R be the legal reader. Our attack consists of two phases.
1. In the first phase, A modifies the first message of R. Next, the tag computes the response and sends it to R. 2. In the second phase, R generates its own messages and sends them to the server. However, A updates the response of the R.
Impersonation Attack: We utilize our generic attack in order to impersonate a victim tag T 0 with another legal tag T i . In this attack, the reader would authenticate T j but the tag in front of R would be T i . The attack steps are carried out as follows.
-R generates a random number r and sends it to the tag T i but during the transmission A corrupts the message and set r ← 0. -T i also generates another random number t and computes M 1 , M 2 , and
-After receiving the quadruple, R generates a time-stamp T and computes V = H(RID ⊕ r ⊕ T ). Next, it dispatches the quadruple along with r, T and V to the server. -During the transmission A sets c as 0, T = T ⊕ r and r ← 0.
Backend Server RFID Reader
-The server first validates the correctness of V by computing
Since c i = 0, the server will do full search on the database. For the first element of database, the server computes T old ← T (M3⊕x old ).r (x old ) and T new ← T (M3⊕xnew).r (x new ). Note that both T old and T new will be equal to 1 because r ← 0 and the property of Chebyshev polynomial T 0 (x) → 1. Now, the server would see that T old is equal to M 2 . The server would also try to verify the correctness of the M 1 but even the server finds that M 1 is not correct, the protocol is not aborted because this case is not really considered in the protocol. Then, the server computes M 3 and M 4 and sends them to R. Finally, the server updates x old , x new , c old and c new .
After this attack, the reader authenticates first entry of the database but the reader interacts with different tag T i .
Desynchronization Attack:
The protocol is vulnerable to desynchronization attack. When two subsequent impersonation attacks are mounted, x old and x new values are both updated incorrectly. This causes that the first tag in the database can no longer be authenticated by a legal reader.
Akgun et al.'s Authentication Protocol
Akgun et al. [2] found some weaknesses on the protocol of Benssalah et al. [6] and proposed an improved version of the protocol.
Protocol Description
Similar to Benssalah et al. , the scheme of Akgun et al.'s also consists of two stages: initialization and authentication. -The server scans whole database and searches a match record. For each entry, the server computes Pick a random r ∈ {0, 1} 
The security analysis of the protocol
In this section, we provide two impersonation attacks and a desyncronization attack that can be practically mounted to the protocol of Akgun et al. . In the first impersonation attack, the adversary actively monitors and modifies the messages between a victim tag and a legal reader, and the messages between the reader and the server. In the second impersonation attack, no tag is needed in order to impersonate the tag whose identity is stored in the first entry of the database. The desyncronization attack can applied to this protocol using the first impersonation attack.
Impersonation Tag-I: Our generic attack can be applied to this protocol in order to impersonate a victim tag T 0 with another legal tag T i . In this attack, the reader R authenticates T j but the tag in front of R would be T i . The attack is performed as follows.
-R generates a random number r and sends it to the tag T i but during the transmission A corrupts the message and set r ← 0. -T i also generates another random number t and computes M 1 and M 2 .
Note that since r = 0, Since c i = 0, the server will perform a full search on the database. For the first element in the database, the server computes T old ← T (M2⊕x old ).r (x old ) and T new ← T (M2⊕xnew).r (x new ). Note that both T old and T new will be equal to 1 because of r = 0 and the property of Chebyshev polynomial T 0 (x) = 1. Now, the server would see that T old is equal to M 1 . Then, the server computes M 3 and M 4 and sends them to R. Finally, the server updates x old , x new , c old and c new .
After this attack, the reader authenticates the first entry in the database but the reader interacts with a different tag T i .
Impersonation Tag-II:
In this attack, there is no need to interact with any tag in order to impersonate the first tag in the database of the server. The attack works as follows. Since c i = 0, the server will perform a full search on the database. For the first element of database, the server computes T old ← T (M2⊕x old ).r (x old ) and T new ← T (M2⊕xnew).r (x new ). Note that both T old and T new will be equal to 1 since r = 0 and due to the property of Chebyshev polynomials T 0 (x) = 1. Now, the server would see that T old is equal to M 1 . Then, the server computes M 3 and M 4 and sends them to R. Finally, the server updates x old , x new , c old and c new .
Desyncronization attack:
The protocol is vulnerable to desynchronization attack. When two subsequent impersonation attacks are mounted, x old and x new are both updated incorrectly. This results in that the first tag in the database can no longer be authenticated by a legal reader.
Our Enhanced Protocol
In this section, we suggest another enhanced chaotic map-based RFID authentication protocol which conforms to EPCGlobal G2 C1 standard. Our protocol utilizes pseudo-random number generation, xor operation and algebraic properties of Chebyshev polynomials.
Protocol description
Figure 3 depicts our enhanced authentication protocol. The protocol consists of two phases: initialization and authentication.
The Initialization step
For each tag, the server generates a random secret key x. Next, the server saves the credentials of each tag in its own database that has the form of Pick a random r ∈ R {0, 1} 
The Authentication step
The authentication of a tag is carried out by performing the following steps;
1. A legitimate RFID reader picks a random number rǫ R {0, 1} ℓ and broadcasts it. 2. Once received r, the tag picks another random number tǫ R {0, 1} ℓ and sets ℓ and computes
and c new ← T s⊕t (x new ) for key updating. 
Security Analysis of the Protocol
In this section, according to the security definitions described in Section 2.2, we provide the security analysis of our enhanced protocol. We prove our proposed protocol satisfies the security and privacy expectations.
Lemma 1 Let T denote a victim legitimate tag in the RFID system. Then, without corrupting T , the secret values of T cannot be computationally recovered.
Proof For each query, T answer back with c i ,
Note that the value of t is randomly refreshed and this is directly used in the computation of M 1 and M 2 . The computational adversary A cannot recover the values of t from M 1 and M 2 with non-negligible probability because of the fact that it is safeguarded by Chebyshev chaotic map hard problems (Definition 5 and Definition 6). On the other hand, the reader sends responses to the tag with Proof We assume that there is a polynomial-time bounded adversary A that impersonates a tag T i to cheat a legal reader R with a non-negligible probability. Having received a random nonce r, A should compute . However, t j+1 and x j are protected by Chebyshev chaotic map because of Definition 5 and Definition 6. So A could use the previous response messages with negligible probability of 2 1−ℓ .
Theorem 3 Our proposed protocol achieves universal untraceability given that T.(.) is an enhanced Chebyshev polynomial with Definition 5 and Definition 6.
Proof Let A denote the adversary who achieves the experiment of universal untraceability with non-negligible probability. Let T 0 and T 1 be the victim tags and R denote the legitimate reader.
-Throughout the learning phase, A executes, eavesdrops, and drops the authentication sessions between T 0 and R and the sessions between T 1 and R. -During the challenge phase, let R perform successful authentications with T 0 and T 1 , so both T 0 and T 1 updates their own secrets. After that, A executes, eavesdrops, and breaks authentication sessions between T b and R where b is chosen randomly. -In the guess phase, A has to guess the value of b. A tries to correlate the responses of the tags in the learning phase and the responses of the T b in the challenge phase. Since the secret values of T b are updated using the help of the Chebyshev chaotic map with Definition 5 and Definition 6, at least one successful authentication yields the responses to be indistinguishable. Therefore, A cannot correlate these responses.
Theorem 4 Our enhanced protocol does not achieve existential untraceability.
Proof Let A be an adversary that executes two different successful authentication runs (say π 1 and π 2 ) with a victim tag T 0 . It is clearly seen that if a legitimate reader does not execute any successful authentication with T 0 between π 1 and π 2 , the database index c i in these runs will be the same. This information gives A to distinguish these two runs. Hence, our protocol does not satisfy existential untraceability.
Theorem 5 Our protocol satisfies forward privacy given that T.(.) is an enhanced Chebyshev polynomial with Definition 5 and Definition 6.
Proof Let A denote the adversary who achieves the experiment of forward privacy with a non-negligible probability. Let T 0 and T 1 be the victim tags and R denote the legitimate reader.
-Throughout the learning phase, A executes, eavesdrops, and drops the authentication sessions between T 0 and R and the sessions between T 1 and R. -During the challenge phase, let R perform successful authentications with T 0 and T 1 , so both T 0 and T 1 updates their own secrets. After that, A executes, eavesdrops, and breaks authentication sessions between T b and R where b is chosen randomly. Also, The internal state of the tag T b is given to
. -In the guess phase, A has to predict the correct value of b. A tries to find out the correlation between the authentication messages eavesdropped in the learning phase and the current internal state of T b . Assume that A recorded an authentication run that occurred during the challenge phase. After the challenge phase, the secret key and index values of T b are updated. Key search complexity
Crypto primitives X,P X,P T,X,C T,X,C T,X,C T,X,C RFID tags are resource constrained devices, i.e., they have low computation powers and small storage capacities. Consequently, RFID protocols employ resource friendly cryptographic mechanisms. In our protocol, tags generate pseudo random numbers, perform xor operations, concatenate bit strings and operate on Chebyshev chaotic maps.
Chebyshev polynomials are employed in various cryptographic schemes including key agreement protocols [26, 34] , password-based authentication schemes [16, 20] , public key encryption schemes [37, 8] , and RFID authentication protocols [11, 6, 3] . The implementation of Chebyshev polynomials uses small resources so that smart cards and RFID tags can utilize them.
From performance point of view, the most critical operation in our scheme is the semi-group property of enhanced Chebyshev chaotic maps, since other operations performed by tag are insignificant such as xor operation and concatenation of bit strings. The number of steps required for the computation of T n (x) grows linearly with n which is later reduced to logarithmic complexity in [17] by making the following observation:
T 2n+1 (x) = 2.T n+1 (x).T n (x) − x
A number of methods have been proposed to reduce the required computation time of T n (x) in [32] . Moreover, the trigonometric equality T n (x) = cos(n.arccos(x)) allows us to compute Chebyshev polynomials more efficiently and implement them on resource constrained devices such as RFID tags.
Security characteristics of our improved protocol is compared with the existing protocols and the findings are summarized in Table 2 . Our improved protocol supports all the desired features which are expected from an RFID authentication protocol. We would provide existential untraceability feature in our protocol by avoiding the c i variable however, this would cause each authentication request to require a search operation with linear complexity. Let C denote concatenation, H denote hash function, M denote message length, P denote pseudo-random number generation, R denote random number generation, S denote modular squaring, SRS denote square root solving, T denote Chebyshev polynomials and X denote xor operation. We compare the computational complexity of our protocol with previous works in Table 3 . The result shows that, our protocol does not exceed the required computation power of previous works though it provides a better security.
Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated the security and privacy of two recently published RFID authentication protocols. The former protocol employs Chebyshev polynomials and we proved that this protocol does not provide resistance against tag impersonation, tracking, and de-synchronization attacks. On the other hand, the latter protocol is the enhanced version of the first one. Notwithstanding the proposed improvements, the latter protocol also contains basic security weaknesses and it is not resistant against tag impersonation, and de-synchronization attacks. Moreover, we offered an improved RFID authentication protocol that employs chaotic maps for low-cost devices. Our protocol complies with the EPC C1-G2 standard and achieves the expected security and privacy requirements.
